Card Network (Scheme) Fees Under Regulatory Scrutiny

What are card network (scheme) fees?

Visa, Mastercard and other card networks charge issuers, acquirers and other participants for participation, processing, services, products, rules, and transaction behavior. UK and Australian regulators generally call these scheme fees; North American banks more often call them network fees. This briefing uses network fees in its own analysis and retains scheme fees when describing regulatory findings that use that term.

The distinction that causes the most confusion is between network fees and interchange. An interchange fee is a transfer, typically from an acquirer to an issuer, associated with a card transaction. It is often regulated or disclosed separately, and it is not the same as a network or scheme fee. A network or scheme fee is charged by the card network itself. A processing fee covers authorization, clearing, settlement or related processing; the UK review examines scheme and processing fees together, while European rules require functional independence and prohibit bundled pricing between scheme and processing activities. A net network fee is gross network or scheme fees less applicable rebates and incentives, and gross schedules alone do not show the full economic position.

Sources: [1], [2], [5], [6]

Network fees are not solely an acquiring-side issue

Many of the headline regulatory metrics focus on acquirers because they connect network fees to merchant acceptance costs. Issuers also incur scheme and processing fees, although the applicable services, pricing drivers, rebates, and incentives differ. Banks operating across issuing and acquiring therefore need visibility into network fees on both sides of their card business.

What did regulators actually find about card network fees?

The signal is broader than fee inflation. Regulators have moved from observing fee growth to requiring better evidence, clearer information, and stronger billing controls.

Three takeaways

1. Fee growth can trigger scrutiny, but the durable concern is whether participants can understand, compare, and reconcile the charges they incur.
2. Recent remedies increasingly specify operating controls: fee definitions, advance notice, billing data, pricing governance, and consistent net financial reporting.
3. Banks should not wait for regulatory intervention. They need their own fee inventory, change process, billing lineage, net economics, and downstream pricing controls.

Four headline figures, four different scopes

The headline numbers below are quoted frequently and misread often. None should be read without its denominator, period, fee scope, and regulatory status.

More than 30% — UK interim finding

A provisional estimate covering scheme and processing fees charged to UK acquirers, after controlling for transaction value, volume, and mix and adjusting for inflation. The five-year windows were scheme-specific: 2017 to 2021 for Mastercard and 2018 to 2022 for Visa. It is not a benchmark for another market and it is not the PSR's final metric. The same interim report estimated that UK businesses paid more than £250 million extra annually.

£170 million — UK final annual estimate

The PSR's final estimate of the additional annual cost of mandatory scheme and processing services paid by acquirers and merchants after the measured fee increases. The comparison baselines were 2017 for Mastercard and 2018 for Visa. It is an increment, not the total annual UK fee pool.

17.8% — Australia, 2024/25

Net scheme fees paid by Australian acquirers, after rebates, as a proportion of merchant service fees on domestic-issued card transactions acquired in Australia. The RBA table includes eftpos, Mastercard, and Visa. It is not the share for cross-border transactions and it is not a universal ratio.

1 April 2027 — Australian roadmap milestone

The date by which designated card networks are expected to publish Scheme Fee Roadmaps and make them available to the RBA. It is a publication and accountability milestone, not a representation that every roadmap measure must be fully implemented by that date.

Sources: [1], [2], [6], [10], [11], [13]

What did the UK Payment Systems Regulator find about scheme fees?

The PSR's central conclusion was not simply that fees had increased, but that the schemes were not subject to effective competitive constraints. It also found that the information available to acquirers and merchants was often incomplete, complex, or difficult to use.

"The overall fee levels charged to acquirers by Mastercard and Visa over the past five years have increased by more than 30% in real terms…"

UK Payment Systems Regulator, interim report MR22/1.9, paragraph 1.4, 21 May 2024. Source [10]. This is a provisional 2024 finding; it is reconciled with the 2025 final report below.

What the PSR found

• The schemes did not face effective competition in core scheme and processing services to acquirers.
• Acquirers and merchants received information that was incomplete, complex, or difficult to use.
• The PSR found little evidence that fee increases were directly linked to cost changes or that new fees were based on detailed cost analysis.

What is the UK doing about card scheme fees?

The PSR selected three remedies, none of which is a price cap. They combine visibility, governance and financial reporting.

Status at 1 August 2026: three remedies had been selected. Final ITC and Pricing Governance directions were expected in summer 2026; no final RFR direction had been imposed. The PSR remained the statutory authority pending planned consolidation into the FCA.

Sources: [1], [2], [3], [4], [15]

What did the Reserve Bank of Australia find about scheme fees?

Australia first strengthened regulatory visibility, then used the evidence to set detailed expectations for how scheme fees should be managed and billed.

"Scheme fees set by the international card networks are opaque and complex."

Reserve Bank of Australia, Conclusions Paper, March 2026. Source [6].

How large are Australian scheme fees?

The RBA reported that scheme fees had grown faster than transaction values. For domestic-issued card transactions acquired in Australia, acquirer net scheme fees represented about one-sixth of merchant service fees. Cross-border economics were materially higher.

A$992.1 million in total scheme fees was paid by Australian acquirers to eftpos, Mastercard, and Visa, after scheme rebates, for domestic-issued card transactions acquired in Australia during 2024/25. This excludes issuer-side fees and cross-border transactions.

10.5 basis points. The A$992.1 million in net scheme fees equaled 10.5 basis points, or 0.105%, of the value of the associated domestic-issued card transactions. This expresses the fee burden relative to payment value. It is not a fee-growth rate.

17.8% of merchant service fees. Acquirer net scheme fees represented 17.8% of the merchant service fees charged on domestic-issued card transactions acquired in Australia. In other words, approximately one-sixth of merchant acceptance-fee revenue was attributable to scheme fees. It does not mean merchants paid 17.8% of transaction value.

A$514.2 million cross-border. Total scheme fees paid by Australian acquirers for cross-border transactions during 2024/25. These fees equaled 158.2 basis points of the associated transaction value, 58.0% of related merchant service fees, and approximately one-third of all net scheme fees paid by Australian acquirers, despite representing only about 3% of the combined acquired transaction value implied by Table 9.

Sources: [5], [6], [13], [17]

What will Australia's Scheme Fee Roadmaps require?

The Roadmaps are expected to set out how designated networks will improve change management, schedules, reconciliation, and billing practices. The expected measures are:

• Contextual justification for fee changes and at least six months' notice.
• Clear classification as mandatory, optional, or behavioral.
• Concise fee schedules with units, rates, effective dates, and non-technical explanations.
• Machine-readable invoices and transaction-level billing reports at no additional cost.
• Actionable opt-out information, error remediation, and transparent behavioral-fee practices.

Where are regulators converging?

The jurisdictions differ in legal tools and market structure, but the control themes are strikingly consistent.

Interpretive boundary

• The findings do not establish that every network fee is unnecessary or that price caps are always the preferred response. They show why clear information, pricing governance, and operational lineage matter.
• The country case studies below extend the comparison to Japan, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, and Canada, where different legal tools expose related transparency and control questions.

Sources: [2], [4]-[6], [18], [20], [22], [23], [26], [30]-[32]

What does weak network fee visibility look like in practice?

Regulators describe different market structures and use different legal tools, but the operating failures they identify can occur wherever fee data, change notices, billing, and downstream pricing are not connected.

The UK links incomplete information to higher costs and forecasting or merchant-billing errors. Australia is requiring clearer schedules, notice, invoices, transaction-level reporting, and remediation.

• United States and Canadian rules show how aggregate reporting and merchant-facing disclosure can improve visibility without producing a complete bank-level fee inventory.
• Mexico, Brazil, and Japan show how interchange controls, competition decisions, disclosure, and payment-system rules address different parts of the same cost stack.
• Across all five case-study markets, public action still leaves individual banks responsible for tracing network charges through their own products, clients, merchants, and financial results.

The absence of a local network-fee action is not evidence that the internal visibility problem does not exist.

Six consequences of inaction

Sources: [2], [5], [6], [18], [22], [26], [30]-[32]

What does good network fee governance look like?

Banks should not wait for regulatory intervention to establish the visibility, governance, and pricing controls needed to manage a changing network-fee environment.

The minimum bank-level visibility stack

Sources: [2], [4], [5], [6], [11], [12], [13], [14]

How are other markets regulating card network fees?

Five further markets have used different legal tools that touch related transparency and control questions. None of them produces a complete bank-level network fee inventory.

Japan: disclosure has not eliminated the information gap

Japan has taken steps on interchange disclosure, while JFTC evidence shows why publication alone may not create commercial visibility or bargaining leverage.

On contract and bargaining conditions, the JFTC's 2019 survey, based on responses from 226 card companies, found a strong probability that certain networks held superior bargaining positions. Cumulative responses also identified unilateral revisions and fee changes as concerns.

On interchange disclosure, an April 2022 JFTC report recommended publication of standard interchange rates. Mastercard, UnionPay, and Visa published them in November 2022. A 2025 follow-up found that 14.7% of merchants knew interchange fees existed and 1.9% had used the published standard rates in negotiations.

On market scale, METI reported ¥134.6 trillion in credit-card payments for calendar year 2025. As volume grows, small unit-cost changes can become material and require disciplined allocation and pricing controls.

Sources: [7]-[9], [16], [26]

United States: aggregate debit-network visibility within a narrower perimeter

U.S. oversight combines debit interchange and routing rules, biennial network data, and antitrust enforcement. It does not provide a complete public inventory of scheme fees.

On debit interchange and routing, Regulation II's cap and routing rules remain operative. In August 2025, a federal district court vacated the rule but stayed the vacatur pending appeal. The appeal remained pending at the report's cutoff.

On network-fee reporting, for 2023 the Federal Reserve reported $12.95 billion in debit-network fees, averaging $0.129 per transaction. Acquirers and merchants paid 64.9%; issuers paid the remainder.

On competition enforcement, the Department of Justice filed its Visa debit-network complaint in September 2024. On 23 June 2025, the court denied Visa's motion to dismiss. The case remains pending and the allegations are not final findings.

Sources: [18], [19], [27], [33]

Mexico: published pricing, competition findings, and active intervention

Mexico combines published merchant pricing with competition intervention and a temporary interchange measure, illustrating the difference between disclosure, market structure, and direct regulatory action.

On published merchant and interchange rates, Banco de México publishes merchant discount rates by business category and institution, as well as debit and credit interchange rates. It explains that merchant discount rates cover interchange plus other acquiring operating costs.

On competition, two separate COFECE actions matter. A September 2023 decision found a lack of effective competition and barriers in domestic card processing by clearinghouses. A December 2023 advisory opinion separately found that published fee information could be difficult for merchants to access and use.

On direct intervention, Banco de México's published debit schedule records a 0% interchange rate for gasoline merchants from 1 May through 31 October 2026 under temporary Disposición 10a Bis.

Sources: [20]-[22], [28], [29]

Brazil: interchange caps and stronger payment-arrangement responsibility

Brazil combines interchange caps, payment-arrangement oversight, stronger settlement responsibility, and competition commitments. These controls affect different parts of network economics.

On interchange caps, BCB Resolution 246 set maximum interchange of 0.5% for debit and 0.7% for prepaid transactions and aligned settlement timing. The provisions took effect on 1 April 2023 and remain unchanged by Resolution 522.

On arrangement responsibility and fee clarity, BCB Resolution 522 strengthened the arrangement institutor's responsibility for settlement and requires arrangement rules to identify fees and penalties clearly, directly, and objectively.

On competition, in 2017 CADE approved two cease-and-desist commitments involving Itaú, Rede, and Hipercard, including ending Hipercard's acquiring exclusivity and enabling reciprocal use of payment terminals. The commitments were not findings of infringement.

Sources: [23]-[25], [30]

Canada: network-fee disclosure tied to merchant communications

Canada's revised Code of Conduct is voluntary at the network-adoption level, but all major Canadian payment card network operators have adopted it. Once adopted, the Code is incorporated into network contracts or governing rules and applies to issuers, acquirers, and downstream participants. It turns network-fee transparency into specific disclosure, statement, and change-notice requirements. The revised Code took effect in two phases, on 30 October 2024 and 30 April 2025.

On public network pricing, payment card network operators must make applicable standard interchange rates, wholesale discount rates, and acquiring network assessment fees easily available on their websites. They must post new or upcoming changes at least 30 calendar days before the effective date.

On merchant applications and statements, applications and agreements require cost-per-transaction and fee disclosures. Merchants must receive or have access, at least monthly, to the effective merchant discount rate; rates and amounts for interchange, wholesale discount rates, network assessment fees, and other charges; and the number and volume of transactions for each payment transaction type.

On fee-change notice, payment card network operators must give acquirers at least 120 calendar days' notice of domestic non-structural core-fee changes and 210 calendar days' notice of domestic structural changes. Acquirers or downstream participants must notify merchants between 30 and 60 calendar days before the effective date of specified new or increased fees passed through, or when applicable domestic core-fee reductions are not passed through in full.

Sources: [31], [34]

The UK evidence file

This section separates the provisional 2024 signal, the final 2025 findings, and the remedies that followed.

"In this report, we present our provisional findings on why increases to scheme and processing fees are unlikely to reflect the interest of all users…"

PSR MR22/1.9 interim report, Introduction, second unnumbered paragraph, page 12 of the PDF. Source [10].

Document sequence

The through-line

• Fee growth triggered scrutiny, but the final response was not a simple price cap.
• The PSR connected weak competition with limited alternatives, constrained bargaining, and information that was difficult to use.
• The remedy architecture seeks visibility into both the participant-facing fee system and the schemes' internal pricing and financial governance.

How to read the more-than-30% interim finding

The 2024 statistic was a provisional, volume-adjusted, real-terms signal using scheme-specific observation periods.

Context supplied by the PSR

• Mastercard and Visa accounted for about 95% of transactions using UK-issued cards, supporting the PSR's view that merchants could not readily avoid the schemes.
• The PSR reported little evidence that service quality had improved at the same rate as fees.
• The interim report also identified complicated pricing statements, difficult access to fee information, delays, and insufficient notice of changes.

Why the interim metric remains useful

Although the final report uses a different scope and period, the interim statistic remains important as a dated indicator of why the regulator moved beyond monitoring. It should be described as a provisional signal, never as the final PSR conclusion and never as a direct benchmark for another market.

The final report narrowed the metric and made the competition conclusion final

The March 2025 report focused its headline on core scheme and processing fees and connected the increase to annual business cost.

"increased their core scheme and processing fees to acquirers by at least 25% since 2017" and "do not provide sufficiently clear and detailed information to acquirers."

PSR MR22/1.10 final report, paragraphs 1.13 and 6.69. Sources [2] and [11].

How the £170 million estimate should be read

Final competition findings relevant to visibility

• Core scheme services were conditions of participation and could not be sourced from alternative providers.
• Core processing alternatives were limited by significant barriers to entry.
• Acquirers and merchants had limited bargaining leverage and limited ability to steer consumers to other payment methods.
• Information quality created additional cost because fee information was incomplete, complex, or difficult to use.

UK remedies: visibility and governance

"We have decided to implement three of those remedies."

PSR CP26/1 publication page, May 2026. Source [4].

Implementation status at 1 August 2026

• In December 2025, the PSR consulted on proposed directions for the information and pricing-governance remedies.
• In May 2026, the PSR published its proposed direction and guidelines for regulatory financial reporting.
• The CP26/1 consultation closed on 3 July 2026. CP26/1 said final ITC and Pricing Governance directions would be published in summer 2026. Pending legislation transferring its functions to the FCA, the PSR remained the statutory authority and publisher. For RFR, the PSR was considering consultation responses and had not yet imposed a final legal direction.

Sources: [1]-[4], [10], [11], [14], [15]

The Australian evidence file

How the RBA built regulatory line of sight in 2021

Australia's 2021 decision responded to complexity by requiring data from both schemes and large participants.

"greater transparency is unlikely to materialise without policy action" and "Meaningful disclosure of scheme fees could partly address these concerns."

RBA Review of Retail Payments Regulation, Chapter 5, Scheme Fees, pages 44-46 of the complete PDF. Sources [5] and [12].

Why rebates matter

The RBA explicitly rejected a fee-schedule-only view as incomplete because schedules do not capture rebates. Its framework therefore measures both gross charges and offsets, creating a net view that can be checked from both sides of the relationship.

Reading the RBA's 17.8% figure

The RBA's Table 9 distinguishes domestic and cross-border transactions, acquiring and issuing, and debit and credit.

"Scheme fees have grown faster than transaction values in recent years."

RBA Conclusions Paper, Chapter 4, page 64 of the complete PDF. Sources [6] and [13].

Three cautions when using 17.8%

1. It applies to net acquirer scheme fees on domestic-issued transactions acquired in Australia.
2. The denominator is merchant service fees, not transaction value. The same row is 10.5 basis points of transaction value.
3. The table includes eftpos, Mastercard, and Visa and uses annualized merchant-service-fee data for part of the reporting period.

Quarterly network-level scheme-fee publication begins in October 2026

The RBA's March 2026 decision requires each designated card network to publish quarterly aggregate scheme-fee and rebate data. The first publication is due by 30 October 2026 for the quarter from 1 July to 30 September 2026.

The 1 April 2027 date is an accountability milestone

What publication by 1 April 2027 means

• Networks are expected to consult participants and publish plans that can be examined against subsequent practice.
• The date is not described as a universal completion deadline for every measure in every Roadmap.
• The RBA will monitor progress and has reserved the possibility of further regulatory action if progress is insufficient.

Why this matters beyond Australia

The Roadmap principles convert the abstract idea of transparency into an operating specification. They identify the fields, notice periods, reports, and remediation practices a participant would need to forecast and reconcile scheme fees with less manual intervention.

Sources: [5], [6], [12], [13], [17]

How to apply this inside a bank

The themes can be translated into internal evidence without assuming the same regulatory response in every market.

The management signal to watch

A rising total fee line is not, by itself, diagnostic. The institution needs to distinguish growth caused by volume, transaction mix, cross-border activity, tokenization, optional-service adoption, behavioral triggers, rate changes, new fee categories, and changes in rebates or incentives.

Sources: [2], [4], [5], [6], [11], [12], [13], [14]

Method and limitations

Prepared by CardTraq. This briefing draws on published regulator and government sources, court records, and one JFTC-commissioned study conducted by Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting and published on the JFTC website. It makes no assessment of any institution's actual fee position and contains no product claims. CardTraq provides network-fee visibility and reconciliation capability, which is the subject the briefing addresses.

This paper is an evidence reader and governance benchmark, not a finding about any specific bank or market.

Method

• Primary reliance on official regulator, government, and court publications verified through 1 August 2026.
• UK interim and final statistics are kept separate because their fee scopes, periods, and status differ.
• Australian monetary and percentage data are reproduced using the categories and denominators in RBA Table 9.
• Short exact quotations are clearly marked. The surrounding analysis is paraphrased, with precise locators and links to complete publications.

Limitations

• No non-public bank fee schedules, invoices, contracts, transaction data, rebates, incentives, or ledger data were reviewed.
• The paper does not estimate network-fee levels or growth outside the specific regulator data cited and does not assess competition in any uncited market.
• Regulatory frameworks, market structures, network participation, routing, product mix, and merchant pricing differ across jurisdictions.
• Currency amounts and ratios should not be transferred to another market without local data and a matched denominator.

This is an informational briefing. It is not legal advice, a prediction of regulation in any market, or a conclusion that any network fee is excessive or unjustified.

Frequently asked questions about card network (scheme) fees

Primary sources

All links point to regulator, government or court websites.

1. Payment Systems Regulator. Market review of card scheme and processing fees: interim report. 21 May 2024.
2. Payment Systems Regulator. Market review of card scheme and processing fees: final report. 6 March 2025.
3. Payment Systems Regulator. Scheme and processing fees remedies consultation. 2 April 2025.
4. Payment Systems Regulator. CP26/1: proposed direction and guidelines for regulatory financial reporting. 21 May 2026.
5. Reserve Bank of Australia. Review of Retail Payments Regulation: Conclusions Paper, Chapter 5, Scheme Fees. October 2021.
6. Reserve Bank of Australia. Review of Merchant Card Payment Costs and Surcharging: Conclusions Paper, Chapter 4, Scheme Fees. March 2026.
7. Japan Fair Trade Commission. Survey of Credit Card Transactions. 13 March 2019.
8. Japan Fair Trade Commission and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Publication of standard interchange fee rates. 30 November 2022.
9. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 2025 Ratio of Cashless Payment Among the Total Amount Paid by Consumers Calculated. 31 March 2026.
10. Payment Systems Regulator. MR22/1.9 interim report, complete publication. May 2024.
11. Payment Systems Regulator. MR22/1.10 final report, complete publication. March 2025.
12. Reserve Bank of Australia. Review of Retail Payments Regulation: Conclusions Paper, complete publication. October 2021.
13. Reserve Bank of Australia. Review of Merchant Card Payment Costs and Surcharging: Conclusions Paper, complete publication. 31 March 2026, updated 19 June 2026.
14. Payment Systems Regulator. CP25/3: consultation on proposed ITC and pricing-governance directions. December 2025.
15. HM Treasury and Payment Systems Regulator. The Payment Systems Regulator Annual Report and Accounts 2025 to 2026. 9 July 2026.
16. Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting, commissioned by the Japan Fair Trade Commission. Post-evaluation of the fact-finding survey on credit card transactions. June 2025. Fieldwork: December 2024 to March 2025.
17. Reserve Bank of Australia. Review of Merchant Card Payment Costs and Surcharging: Conclusions Paper, Chapter 5, Transparency of Wholesale Fees. March 2026.
18. Federal Reserve Board. 2023 Interchange Fee Revenue, Covered Issuer Costs, and Covered Issuer and Merchant Fraud Losses Related to Debit Card Transactions. Data covering calendar year 2023.
19. U.S. Department of Justice. Justice Department Sues Visa for Monopolizing Debit Markets. 24 September 2024.
20. Banco de México. Tasas de descuento que pagan los comercios por aceptar pagos con tarjetas. Information current to July 2026.
21. Banco de México. Cuotas de Intercambio, comisiones. Accessed 1 August 2026.
22. Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica. Recomendaciones para promover la competencia en los servicios de recepción de pagos con tarjeta. 1 December 2023.
23. Banco Central do Brasil. Resolução BCB nº 246, de 26 de setembro de 2022. Effective 1 April 2023.
24. Banco Central do Brasil. Arranjos e instituições de pagamento já fazem parte do cotidiano do cidadão. Official payment-arrangement explainer.
25. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica. Cade celebra acordos com Itaú, Rede e Hipercard para estimular concorrência no mercado de meios de pagamentos eletrônicos. 5 April 2017; page updated 18 June 2026.
26. Japan Fair Trade Commission. Fact-finding Survey on Credit Card Transactions. 8 April 2022.
27. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. United States v. Visa Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order. 23 June 2025.
28. Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica. Cofece identificó barreras a la competencia en el mercado de procesamiento de pagos con tarjeta. 14 September 2023.
29. Banco de México. Cuotas de intercambio por el uso de tarjetas de débito en terminales punto de venta. Gasoline-merchant schedule effective 1 May to 31 October 2026.
30. Banco Central do Brasil. Resolução BCB nº 522, de 10 de novembro de 2025. Payment-arrangement risk, settlement, and fee-clarity requirements.
31. Financial Consumer Agency of Canada. Code of Conduct for the Payment Card Industry in Canada. Effective 30 October 2024.
32. European Union. Regulation (EU) 2015/751 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions. Articles 3, 4, 7, and 9.
33. U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota. Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, order on summary judgment. 6 August 2025; vacatur stayed pending appeal.
34. Financial Consumer Agency of Canada. Appearance before the House Standing Committee on Industry and Technology: Code of Conduct for the Payment Card Industry issue sheet and two-phase implementation timeline. 10 October 2024.

About the author and CardTraq

Steven Leitman is Managing Partner at CardTraq. He is a former Amex and Visa executive and Deloitte Strategy consultant with a breadth of payment experience, and founded CardTraq to focus on creating impactful solutions to card economics challenges.

CardTraq is a CRG business focused on helping card issuers, acquirers, BIN sponsors, and other payment providers understand and manage network-fee and interchange economics.

Its work combines payments-industry expertise with structured fee data, change monitoring, reconciliation, cost allocation, and governance capabilities. The objective is to help institutions explain what they are being charged, identify the drivers of change, and maintain accurate downstream economics.

This briefing is informational and does not assess any institution's fee position or recommend a particular regulatory outcome.

Related reading: Card Network (Scheme) Fees Explained: what they are, how they are assessed, and why they keep rising.

Version 2.0 · Published 1 August 2026 · Sources verified through 1 August 2026 · Last reviewed August 2026. The current version of this briefing is always published at this URL.